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[We fear that] this case will become another Jarndyce v. 
Jarndyce, with the participants “mistily engaged in one 
of the ten thousand stages of an endless cause, tripping 
one another up on slippery precedents, groping knee-
deep in technicalities, running their . . . heads against 
walls of words, and making a pretence of equity . . . .” 
 
—The Sixth Circuit, bemoaning the procedural complexities 
facing federal takings litigants1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the 1985 case Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,2 the Supreme 
Court articulated the requirement that in order to challenge a 
putative regulatory taking by a state or local entity under the 
Fifth Amendment in federal court, a claimant must first seek 
compensation in state court.3  Twenty years later, in San Remo 
Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco,4 the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that, because of issue-preclusion principles, 
the Williamson County requirement could exile a large proportion 
of Fifth Amendment takings plaintiffs from federal court.5 
This line of precedent opened a Pandora’s box of unforeseen 
complications, spawning many more questions than it purported to 
answer.  Perhaps most important is what kind of requirement the 
rule actually is.  I contend that a faithful reading of Williamson 
County as originally reasoned—instituting a rule of “ripeness” 
grounded in the Constitution—runs the risk of inflicting 
considerable (and unintentional) harm on litigants and the judicial 
system alike.   
The rule, therefore, ought to be reconceptualized as a matter of 
merely “prudential” ripeness.  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
taken a few steps in this direction, but its remarks on the matter 
                                                                                                       
 1 Kruse v. Vill. of Chagrin Falls, 74 F.3d 694, 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting CHARLES 
DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 2 (Oxford University Press 1989) (1853)). 
 2 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 3 Id. at 195. 
 4 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 5 Id. at 346. 
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have been largely conclusory.  This Article seeks to supply a 
rationale for justifying that maneuver.  
Part II provides background, summarizing the Williamson 
County and San Remo Hotel opinions.  Part III outlines the 
emergence of the principal question explored here—whether 
Williamson County’s ripeness requirement derives from the 
Constitution itself or, instead, from mere prudential 
considerations—and examines the answers tendered by previous 
observers.  Although a handful of courts and commentators have 
considered (or offered cursory comments on) this question, this 
Article is intended to do so in a comparatively comprehensive 
manner. 
In order to offer a solution to this puzzle, I attempt in Part IV to 
demonstrate the superiority of a prudential reading of Williamson 
County with respect to four ongoing areas of uncertainty: (1) 
whether so-called “facial” Fifth Amendment takings claims are 
subject to the rule, (2) whether diversity and supplemental 
jurisdiction are available in federal court for prerequisite state 
causes of action, (3) whether litigants attempting to raise Fifth 
Amendment takings claims in state courts must satisfy the 
requirement, and (4) how claim preclusion could operate in this 
context, particularly in state courts.  Because prudential 
justiciability rules, among other features, are amenable to 
exceptions where the policy rationales that they were intended to 
promote are not implicated or where countervailing concerns 
predominate, viewing the compensation prong in this light permits 
a comparison of competing considerations in the context of specific 
cases and, ultimately, allows courts to avoid some of the most 
surprising and senseless potential implications of alternative 
understandings. 
II.  THE PIECES 
This Part retraces the weaving of what any scholar of federal 
jurisdiction would recognize as a very tangled web.  The Supreme 
Court first addressed the “ripeness” of Fifth Amendment 
regulatory-takings claims over twenty-five years ago in 
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 
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Bank of Johnson City,6 discussed in Part II.A.  In 2005, the Court 
answered a single follow-up question in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. 
City and County of San Francisco,7 addressed in Part II.B.  Since 
then, the Court has largely left lower tribunals and academics to 
undertake the task of sifting through the intricacies and 
implications of those two brief but important forays into the field. 
A.  WILLIAMSON COUNTY 
Voting seven to one, the Justices may have considered 
Williamson County a relatively simple case.8  Time, however, 
would demonstrate that it was anything but. 
The facts are fairly straightforward.  A bank seeking to develop 
a swath of land into a subdivision alleged that the enforcement of 
various county zoning provisions constituted a regulatory taking 
under the Fifth Amendment.9  The bank sued in federal court 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10  Although the lower courts reached the 
merits, ultimately ruling in the bank’s favor, the Supreme Court—
with Justice Blackmun writing for the majority—held that the 
claim was not ripe for adjudication.11   
The Court outlined two bases for that conclusion.  First, “a 
claim that the application of government regulations effects a 
taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government 
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a 
final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the 
property at issue.”12  Here, although the county had denied the 
bank’s development plan, the bank had not availed itself of further 
opportunities for administrative review.  Specifically, the bank had 
                                                                                                       
 6 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 7 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 8  Justice White dissented without opinion.  Justice Powell took no part in the decision.  
473 U.S. at 200.  Indeed, the Court chose to dispose of the case on the ripeness grounds 
discussed anon rather than to answer directly the question on which it had granted 
certiorari: whether the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause—as opposed to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses—is the appropriate vehicle for challenging 
temporary regulatory takings.  Id. at 185.  The Court apparently found this question so 
difficult that it had left it undecided twice before and chose to do so again here.  Id. (citing 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)). 
 9 Id. at 175. 
 10 Id. at 182. 
 11 Id. at 182, 200. 
 12 Id. at 186. 
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failed to seek individualized variances from the generally 
applicable zoning ordinances under which its plan was blocked.13   
Although the hook for that holding was apparently the textual 
principle that the government cannot commit a “taking” before 
reaching a final decision on the disposition of property, the Court 
explained its reasoning primarily in terms of its own precedent.  
Prior cases indicated that two of the most important factors for 
determining whether a taking has occurred are “the economic 
impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it 
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations.”14  
Neither of those factors, the Court explained, can be adequately 
evaluated until the administrative body in question has arrived at 
a “final, definitive position” concerning the application of the 
relevant regulations to the challenger’s property.15  I refer to this 
requirement as the Williamson County “takings” prong or 
requirement.16 
The second reason that the claim was unripe, the Supreme Court 
explained, was that the bank had not sought compensation through 
the procedures provided by the state.  “The Fifth Amendment does 
not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without 
just compensation,” the Court stated.17  And compensation need not 
be tendered before or at the time of the taking, the Court concluded: 
“[A]ll that is required is that a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate 
provision for obtaining compensation’ exist.”18  This Article calls the 
                                                                                                       
 13 Id. at 187–88. 
 14 Id. at 191 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); PruneYard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)). 
 15 Id.  
 16 The bank protested that requiring it to pursue administrative process flouted the 
holding of Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), that § 1983 plaintiffs need 
not exhaust state administrative remedies before securing their day in federal court.  
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192.  The Court responded by drawing a (perhaps arguable) 
distinction between finality and exhaustion: “the finality requirement is concerned with 
whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that 
inflicts an actual, concrete injury,” whereas “the exhaustion requirement generally refers to 
administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an 
adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise 
inappropriate.”  Id. at 193.   
 17 Id. at 194. 
 18 Id. (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124–25 (1974) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The string of precedent on which the Court 
relied also included Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1016; Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 
309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940); and Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932). 
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requirement that challengers pursue such procedures the 
Williamson County “compensation” prong or requirement. 
The Court grounded the compensation requirement in the text 
of the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing that “no constitutional 
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.”19  The 
requirement was said to flow ineluctably from the very “nature of 
the constitutional right.”20  Unlike the takings prong, however, the 
Court made clear that the compensation prong extends past the 
state administrative scheme, requiring an individual alleging a 
regulatory taking to seek payment before the state judiciary—at 
least, if that is where any pertinent procedural mechanisms are 
located, as is generally the case.  Thus, in Williamson County, the 
Court rested its conclusion that the plaintiff’s claim was unripe on 
the fact that Tennessee law provided an inverse-condemnation 
cause of action that the bank had not pursued.21   
Williamson County’s takings prong has met little resistance in 
lower courts or the academy.  But the same cannot be said for the 
perennially controversial and confusing compensation prong.22  
B.  SAN REMO HOTEL 
Following Williamson County, the Supreme Court largely 
avoided disputes over the ripeness of Fifth Amendment takings 
claims for twenty years.  It returned to the topic in 2005 with San 
Remo Hotel,23 which addressed whether federal courts could craft 
an exception to the so-called “Full Faith and Credit Statute,” 28 
U.S.C. § 1738,24 for issues that Williamson County caused to be 
                                                                                                       
 19 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13 (emphasis added). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 196–97 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-123 (1980)). 
 22 It may be worth specifying at the outset that although Williamson County’s 
compensation prong has been subject to sustained and often withering criticism—for recent 
examples, see, e.g., Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still Forced to 
Play?, 30 TOURO L. REV. 297 (2014); J. David Breemer, The Rebirth of Federal Takings 
Review? The Courts’ “Prudential” Answer to Williamson County’s Flawed State Litigation 
Ripeness Requirement, 30 TOURO L. REV. 319 (2014); Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of 
the End?  Horne v. Department of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2013 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 245—this Article remains agnostic about whether the Supreme Court 
ought to overrule it and assumes that the doctrine is here to stay. 
 23 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
 24 “[J]udicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court 
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage 
in the courts of such State . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). 
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decided in state court—such that regulatory-takings plaintiffs 
would be assured an opportunity for review before the federal 
bench.25  The Court answered in the negative.26  
The facts and procedural history of San Remo Hotel are fairly 
complex, making a somewhat detailed sketch helpful.  In the late 
1970s, San Francisco sought to combat a shortage of affordable 
housing by heavily regulating the conversion of “residential” hotel 
units to “tourist” units.27  In order to commence such conversions, 
hotel owners were required to build new residential units, 
rehabilitate old ones, or pay “in lieu” fees.  To facilitate the 
scheme, each hotel was required to report the number of 
residential and tourist units that it operated.28  At the time, the 
San Remo Hotel operated as a bed and breakfast, but its 
management erroneously reported that it was entirely 
residential.29  When the mistake came to light many years later, 
the hotel was required to apply for a conversion permit.30  The city 
agreed to issue the permit, but only on the condition that the 
owners pay a $567,000 in-lieu fee.31  
The hotel owners filed suit under § 1983 in federal district 
court, asserting facial and as-applied regulatory-takings claims, 
among others.32  The district court dismissed both, holding the 
facial claims barred by the applicable statute of limitations and 
the as-applied claims unripe under Williamson County because the 
hotel owners had not pursued an inverse-condemnation suit in 
state court.33  The Ninth Circuit affirmed with respect to the as-
applied claims.34  As for the facial claims, the plaintiffs took the 
unusual step of urging the court to apply “Pullman abstention” to 
allow the parties to litigate a potentially dispositive state statutory 
question (concerning the propriety of the city’s initial classification 
of the hotel as residential) in state court.35  The court agreed, 
                                                                                                       
 25 San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 327. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 328. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 328–29. 
 30 Id. at 328. 
 31 Id. at 329. 
 32 Id. at 330. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 331. 
 35 Id. at 330.  This sort of abstention was initially articulated in Railroad Commission of 
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
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though it noted that its decision to abstain had nothing to do with 
ripeness, stating that the main facial claim was “ ‘ripe the instant 
the [challenged regulation] was enacted.’ ”36  The Ninth Circuit 
instructed the plaintiffs that if they “wanted to ‘retain [their] right 
to return to federal court for adjudication of [their] federal claim, 
[they] must make an appropriate reservation in state court,’ ”37 
referring to the procedural device known as an “England 
reservation.”38  
In state court, the hotel owners pursued the state statutory 
question, but they also raised broad takings claims under the 
California constitution while purporting to reserve their Fifth 
Amendment claims.39  Despite acknowledging the reservation, the 
California Supreme Court observed that the takings provisions of 
the state and federal constitutions were “ ‘construed . . . 
congruently’ ” and then analyzed the state claims under Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence, ruling in favor of the city.40  The hotel 
owners then returned to federal district court, seeking to revive 
and amend the complaint from which the Ninth Circuit had 
abstained.41  The district court held that their claims were barred 
not only by the statute of limitations but also by the doctrine of 
issue preclusion embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 
under which federal courts must accord dispositive effect to state 
judgments that would be preclusive in the courts of the judgment-
rendering state.42  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.43 
The Supreme Court—with Justice Stevens writing for the 
majority—began its analysis by expounding the importance of the 
principles encoded in the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 
characterizing preclusion doctrine as critical to “ ‘the very object 
for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the 
peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of 
judicial determination.’ ”44  Unsurprisingly, the Court proceeded to 
                                                                                                       
 36 San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 330–31 (quoting 145 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 37 Id. at 331 (quoting 145 F.3d at 1106 n.7) (alterations in original). 
 38 Id. at 331 n.6.  This strategy for softening the effects of Pullman abstention was 
originally noted in England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 420–21 
(1964). 
 39 San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 331–34. 
 40 Id. at 332, 334 (quoting 41 P.3d 87, 100–01 (Cal. 2002)). 
 41 Id. at 334. 
 42 Id. at 334–35. 
 43 Id. at 335. 
 44 Id. at 337 (quoting S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897)). 
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reject the hotel owners’ entreaty for an exception where Fifth 
Amendment takings plaintiffs must start in state court by virtue 
of Williamson County, even where they seek to preserve federal 
claims under England.45  The essence of the argument was that 
absent such an exception, issue preclusion would very often bar 
federal courts from hearing takings claims, thereby denying a 
federal forum for the vindication of a federal right.46 
With regard to England, the Court explained that “[t]he 
purpose of [Pullman] abstention is not to afford state courts an 
opportunity to adjudicate an issue that is functionally identical to 
the federal question,” but rather “to avoid resolving the federal 
question by encouraging a state-law determination that may moot 
the federal controversy.”47  Thus, because they chose to submit to 
the California courts state constitutional claims in addition to the 
statutory issue that had caused the Ninth Circuit to abstain, the 
plaintiffs could not claim the benefits of England for purposes of 
their facial Fifth Amendment claims.48  Moreover, England 
provided even weaker support for federal-court adjudication of the 
plaintiffs’ as-applied claims, the Court explained.  Because the 
federal courts never possessed jurisdiction over those claims in the 
first place under Williamson County (and the Ninth Circuit 
therefore dismissed rather than abstained from them), “there was 
no reason to expect that they could be relitigated in full if 
advanced in the state proceedings.”49 
The Court explicitly rebuffed the policy argument that “ ‘[i]t 
would be both ironic and unfair if the very procedure that the 
Supreme Court required [plaintiffs] to follow before bringing a 
Fifth Amendment takings claim . . . also precluded [them] from 
ever bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim’ ” in federal 
court.50  The Court denied that plaintiffs have an absolute right to 
vindicate federal claims in federal forums;51 scoffed at the 
                                                                                                       
 45 Id. at 338. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 339. 
 48 See id. at 341 (“[P]etitioners effectively asked the state court to resolve the same 
federal issues they asked it to reserve.  England does not support . . . any such right.”). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 342 (alterations in original). 
 51 The Court asserted that inter-system-preclusion precedent had repeatedly rejected 
that assumption even as to litigants who are forced to air their claims first in state court.  
See id. (citing, inter alia, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103–04 (1980) (holding plaintiff 
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suggestion that “courts may simply create exceptions to . . . § 1738 
wherever courts deem them appropriate,” even for arguably 
“laudable policy goal[s]”;52 and noted the irony that the hotel 
owners were never required to ripen their facial claims in state 
court in the first place but voluntarily requested abstention.53 
In closing, the Court briefly commended the federalism virtues 
furthered by Williamson County.  The whole of the statement on 
the subject was that “[s]tate courts are fully competent to 
adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use decisions.  
Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than 
federal courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and 
legal questions relating to zoning and land-use regulations.” 54  
III.  THE PUZZLE 
A.  PARAMETERS OF THE INQUIRY  
In one of his last opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in 
the judgment of San Remo Hotel.55  He wrote separately to state 
that Williamson County’s compensation prong “may have been 
mistaken” and should be reconsidered, despite his having joined 
the majority in that decision.56  Specifically, he stated: 
It is not clear to me that Williamson County was 
correct in demanding that, once a government entity 
has reached a final decision with respect to a 
claimant’s property, the claimant must seek 
compensation in state court before bringing a federal 
takings claim in federal court.  The Court in 
Williamson County purported to interpret the Fifth 
Amendment in divining this state-litigation 
requirement.  See, e.g., 473 U.S. at 194 (referencing 
                                                                                                       
precluded from raising Fourth Amendment challenge in federal court under § 1983 where 
state court had previously rejected same claim in exclusionary-rule context)).  
 52 Id. at 344.  Rather, “Congress must clearly manifest its intent to depart from § 1738” 
via “an express or implied partial repeal” in a later-enacted statute.  Id. at 344–45 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 53 Id. at 345 (citing Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992)). 
 54 Id. at 347. 
 55 Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment, joined by O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Thomas, JJ.). 
 56 Id.  O’Connor’s joining the concurrence also represented a reversal of course. 
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“[t]he nature of the constitutional right”).  More 
recently, we have referred to it as merely a prudential 
requirement.  Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1997).57   
Ultimately, Rehnquist concluded, “[i]t is not obvious that either 
constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize 
all state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal 
takings claim.”58 
Rehnquist’s separate opinion brought to light an important 
question: what, precisely, are the underpinnings of Williamson 
County’s compensation prong?  Does the Constitution actually 
command the rule, as intimated by Williamson County itself?  Or 
is it better characterized as grounded in judicial conceptions of 
sound federalism policy?  And why does it matter?  That, in a 
nutshell, is the puzzle to which I hope to offer a solution. 
The remainder of this Part fleshes out the puzzle’s parameters.  
Part III.B.1 outlines the doctrine of ripeness in its constitutional 
and prudential forms as pertinent to the takings context.  Part 
III.B.2 follows with a descriptive overview of relevant 
jurisprudence and commentary.  Of particular importance, the 
Supreme Court has recently spoken to this long-simmering debate, 
but it has purported to solve only a portion of the puzzle and 
provided nary a word of explanation about why or how it arrived 
at that solution.   
This Article ultimately argues that it would be wise to classify 
the compensation requirement as prudential rather than 
constitutional.  Recognizing a prudential solution to the ripeness 
puzzle both offers an analytical tool for beginning to break the 
impasse on a number of difficult doctrinal questions and provides 
the most—sometimes perhaps the only—sensible answers. 
                                                                                                       
 57 Id. at 349 (citations shortened). 
 58 Id.  As for the possibility that Williamson County’s compensation prong is justified by 
prudential principles, Rehnquist contended that the case simply had not been convincingly 
made—and that he doubted it could, given the costs to litigants of fulfilling the 
requirement.  Id. at 350–52.  Rehnquist pointed out that the majority’s statement that state 
courts are competent and experienced in adjudicating land-use issues does not distinguish 
takings claims from other constitutional challenges relating to land-use law—say, in the 
First Amendment context.  Id. at 350–51 (citing, inter alia, Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (holding that localities may prohibit adult theaters through 
content-neutral zoning regulations)).  Rehnquist thus asked why “federal takings claims in 
particular should be singled out to be confined to state court.”  Id. at 351. 
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B.  THREE SHADES OF RIPENESS 
1.  In Theory.  Justiciability rules determine what matters are 
appropriate for decision in courts of law—as opposed to, perhaps, 
the political branches.59  Justiciability encompasses the political-
question and advisory-opinion doctrines, as well as standing, 
ripeness, and mootness.60  Ripeness, generally stated, is the rule 
that the injury of which a plaintiff complains cannot be overly 
speculative.61  Thus, the central concern is whether the case 
involves uncertain or “ ‘contingent future events that may not occur 
as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’ ”62  To the extent that 
the doctrines are actually separable, whereas standing asks 
whether the party before the court has suffered a judicially 
cognizable injury and mootness asks whether the dispute remains 
live, “ripeness asks whether there yet is any need for the court to 
act.”63 
Some justiciability principles, the Supreme Court has made 
clear, derive from Article III’s limitation of the federal judicial 
power to “Cases” and “Controversies.”64  Those are traditionally 
known as “constitutional” justiciability doctrines.  Others, in 
contrast, derive from the judiciary’s own notions of “prudent 
judicial administration”—that is, where “wise policy militates 
against judicial review,”65 generally because certain cases “are 
more appropriately resolved in another forum.”66  Those are 
“prudential” justiciability doctrines.  The Supreme Court has 
described ripeness requirements in both constitutional and 
prudential terms depending on the context,67 and the Second 
                                                                                                       
 59 See Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 
1481–84 (2006). 
 60 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.1 (5th ed. 2007). 
 61 See id. § 2.4.1. 
 62 Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990) (quoting 13A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532 (2d ed. 1984)). 
 63 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, § 3532.1.   
 64 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, § 2.1. 
 65 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, § 2.1. 
 66 Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the Debate over Federal 
Property Rights Legislation, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3 n.7 (1999). 
 67 For examples of the Court invoking ripeness in Article III terms, see Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458 (1974), and Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433 (1975).  For 
examples of the Court describing ripeness as a merely prudential requirement, see Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010). 
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Circuit has offered the following helpful overview of the distinction 
between the two: 
Constitutional ripeness is a doctrine that, like 
standing, is a limitation on the power of the judiciary.  
It prevents courts from declaring the meaning of the 
law in a vacuum and from constructing generalized 
legal rules unless the resolution of an actual dispute 
requires it.  But when a court declares that a case is 
not prudentially ripe, it means that the case will be 
better decided later and that the parties will not have 
constitutional rights undermined by the delay.  It does 
not mean that the case is not a real or concrete dispute 
affecting cognizable current concerns of the parties 
within the meaning of Article III. . . . Prudential 
ripeness is, then, a tool that courts may use to enhance 
the accuracy of their decisions and to avoid becoming 
embroiled in adjudications that may later turn out to 
be unnecessary or may require premature examination 
of, especially, constitutional issues that time may 
make easier or less controversial.68 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has quite recently thrown 
some quantity of cold water on the propriety of prudential ripeness 
(and, indeed, all prudential justiciability doctrines).  In particular, 
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus69 presented, among other 
issues, a prudential-ripeness question.  Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Thomas’s opinion stated that “[t]o the extent 
respondents would have us deem petitioners’ claims nonjusticiable 
on grounds that are ‘prudential,’ rather than constitutional,’ ‘[t]hat 
request is in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the 
principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide’ cases 
within its jurisdiction ‘is virtually unflagging.’ ”70  But the Court 
concluded that it “need not resolve the continuing vitality of the 
prudential ripeness doctrine” because immediate adjudication was 
                                                                                                       
 68 Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 69 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
 70 Id. at 2347 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1377, 1386 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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obviously appropriate in that case.71  Whether the Court will 
continue down that path remains to be seen, but this Article 
assumes the doctrine’s continued survival. 
Some observers have posited that the compensation 
requirement may be more sui generis than the conventional 
dichotomy between constitutional and prudential ripeness rules 
suggests.  In particular, Professor Gene Nichol makes a compelling 
argument that Williamson County invoked ripeness in a different 
sort of constitutional way—based not on Article III (which he 
argues should never form the basis of ripeness doctrines72) but on 
the Fifth Amendment itself.73  As such,  
ripeness doctrine [is] . . . used to measure the demands 
of substantive . . . constitutional causes of action.  This 
application of the doctrine does not relate to 
jurisdictional power at all.  Instead, it is an aspect of 
actionability analysis—that is, the determination of 
whether the litigant has stated a claim on which relief 
can be granted.74   
Accordingly, Nichol contends that Williamson County’s “ripeness” 
requirements are actually merits-level prerequisites for stating a 
Fifth Amendment takings claim: they are “elements” of the cause 
of action.75   
 Key to this framing of Williamson County is the opinion’s 
fundamentally textual analysis.  As Justice Blackmun explained: 
“[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just 
compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just 
compensation has been denied.  The nature of the constitutional 
                                                                                                       
 71 Id. 
 72 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156 
(1987) (“I argue that a marriage of ripeness and article III is flawed.  Not only is it 
inconsistent with the Court’s depiction of the case or controversy requirement, it is a wrong 
turn analytically—both for ripeness and for article III.”); accord Evan Tsen Lee, 
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 608–
10 (1992) (similar argument focusing on mootness). 
 73 Nichol, supra note 72, at 162, 164–70. 
 74 Id. at 162. 
 75 Id. at 176. 
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right therefore requires that a property owner utilize procedures 
for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.”76 
All in all, therefore, there are two different ways in which 
Williamson County’s compensation prong can be understood as 
encoding a constitutional requirement—traditionally, as a 
component of the case-or-controversy constraint (what one might 
call “Article-III-based” ripeness), or idiosyncratically, as an 
elemental ingredient of what it takes to inflict injury under the 
text of the Takings Clause (what one might call “Fifth-
Amendment-based” ripeness).  To the extent that the 
compensation prong represents constitutional ripeness concerns 
whatsoever, Nichol quite likely has the better of the argument 
given the emphasis that Williamson County placed on the text of 
the Fifth Amendment.   
2.  As Applied.  Williamson County did not describe its just-
compensation requirement as prudential in any way; rather, the 
Court’s reasoning was rooted in the Constitution through and 
through.  As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his San Remo Hotel 
concurrence, however, the rationale behind the rule has become 
the subject of significant ambiguity over time.77   
Rehnquist cited Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, in 
which the Court noted that “[t]he [government] does not question 
that [the plaintiff] properly presents a genuine ‘case or 
controversy’ sufficient to satisfy Article III” and then explicitly 
labeled the Williamson County requirements “two independent 
prudential hurdles to a regulatory-takings claim brought against a 
state entity in federal court.”78  The Court did not, however, 
explain why the doctrine was abruptly deemed prudential or what 
policies it might advance. 
Although Rehnquist did not cite it, others have noted that 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council79 framed Williamson 
County in prudential terms as well.80  There, Justice Scalia wrote 
the following for the majority: 
                                                                                                       
 76 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 
172, 194 n.13 (1985). 
 77 545 U.S. 323, 349 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 78 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 & n.7 (1997). 
 79 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 80 See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 
638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, A Prudential 
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[Petitioner] has properly alleged Article III injury in 
fact in this case . . . . That there is a discretionary 
“special permit” procedure by which he may regain—
for the future, at least—beneficial use of his land goes 
only to the prudential “ripeness” of [his] challenge, and 
for the reasons discussed we do not think it prudent to 
apply that prudential requirement here.81 
In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that Williamson County’s 
ripeness requirements—of which he was the original architect—are 
“not simply a gesture of good will to land-use planners.”82  Rather, 
“[i]n the absence of ‘a final and authoritative determination of the 
type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject 
property’ and the utilization of state procedures for just 
compensation, there is no final judgment, and in the absence of a 
final judgment there is no jurisdiction.”83  “This rule,” Blackmun 
continued, quoting Williamson County, “is ‘compelled by the very 
nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause.’ ”84  
And, he concluded, the rule (specifically, the takings prong) had not 
been satisfied in the case at bar.85 
Although at least one lower-court opinion read the majority’s 
statement in Lucas as definitively resolving the Williamson 
County ripeness puzzle,86 Scalia’s remark has not been interpreted 
that way by many observers.  Nor was it viewed that way by the 
Supreme Court itself, as Rehnquist’s San Remo Hotel concurrence 
made clear by criticizing the majority for “conspicuously leav[ing] 
open” the question whether Williamson County’s compensation 
prong “is merely a prudential rule, and not a constitutional 
mandate.”87 
                                                                                                       
Theory for Providing a Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
445, 468 (2001). 
 81 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012–13. 
 82 Id. at 1041 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 83 Id. (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)) 
(other citations omitted). 
 84 Id. (quoting 473 U.S. 172, 190 (1985)). 
 85 Id. at 1041–43. 
 86 See Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he [Supreme] 
Court has explicitly held that the Williamson requirements are merely prudential 
requirements.”).  Although that decision was vacated, see 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc), the replacement opinion resolved the issue in the same way by combining Suitum 
and circuit precedent, see id. at 1117. 
 87 See 545 U.S. 323, 352 n.2 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
2014]  JUSTIFYING A PRUDENTIAL SOLUTION 179 
To be specific, although relatively few academics devoted 
significant attention to the particular source of the compensation 
requirement, suppositions in the years following Lucas were 
decidedly mixed.  “It is unclear whether the Williamson County 
[compensation] prong is a constitutional or prudential 
requirement,” one author noted, citing San Remo Hotel.88  
“[A]lthough ripeness decisions are often based on prudential 
considerations, the Court in Williamson County held that the 
[compensation] requirement is based on the text of Article III and 
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,” declared another 
author (pre-San Remo Hotel), despite citing Suitum and Lucas.89   
Nevertheless, even before the Supreme Court’s most recent 
comments on the issue, the tide may have turned toward viewing 
the compensation prong as a prudential rule.  One commentator, for 
example, contended that “there are several prudential issues 
wrapped up in the concern for ripeness that better explain the 
results” of Williamson County.90  And a set of scholars similarly 
distinguished between “jurisdictional content,” apparently referring 
to Article III principles, and “takings-ripeness doctrine,” arguing 
that the Supreme Court has “consistently . . . refused” to mix the 
two.91  Professor Stewart Sterk, for his part, accurately described 
the Court’s jurisprudential arc, stating that whereas “[t]he 
Williamson County opinion itself justified [the compensation] 
requirement primarily in formal [constitutional] terms,” San Remo 
Hotel “added a prudential justification.”92 
                                                                                                       
 88 See Scott A. Keller, Note, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness: 
Eliminating the Williamson County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings 
Claims, 85 TEX. L. REV. 199, 209 (2006) (ultimately arguing that Williamson County does 
not concern ripeness at all but instead constitutes “judicial jurisdiction stripping”). 
 89 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The 
Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson County, 26 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9 (1999). 
 90 Eric A. Lindberg, Comment, Multijurisdictionality and Federalism: Assessing San 
Remo Hotel’s Effect on Regulatory Takings, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1859–60 (2010). 
 91 Martinez & Martinez, supra note 80, at 467. 
 92 Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
251, 284–85 (2006).  Another thoroughgoing article presented a systematic argument for 
why the compensation prong should not be characterized as an Article-III-based rule.  See 
Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 66, at 25–35.  But because the article characterized the rule 
as articulating both a prudential preference and a Fifth-Amendment-based rule, see id. 
(calling the requirement both “a rule of prudence” and “an element of a cause of action”), it 
managed to avoid what amounts to an important distinction here. 
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In any event, the Supreme Court, again speaking through 
Justice Scalia, purported to solve a portion of the puzzle in the 
2010 case Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection.93  The questions before 
the Court were whether and, if so, under what standard judicial 
action can violate the Takings Clause.  A plurality concluded that 
the judiciary can indeed effect an unconstitutional taking if it 
“declares that what was once an established right of private 
property no longer exists.”94  Then, turning to the case at bar, a 
portion of the opinion joined by all eight of the participating 
Justices noted that “respondents raise [a] preliminary point[ ] 
which need not detain us long.”95  Specifically, “[t]he city and the 
county [respondents] argue . . . that the claim is unripe because 
petitioner has not sought just compensation”—a Williamson 
County compensation-prong argument.96  The Court declared that 
because “[n]either [this] objection [nor another] appeared in the 
briefs in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari, and since 
neither is jurisdictional, we deem both waived.”97  Ultimately, the 
unanimous Court held that no taking had occurred.98 
As an initial matter, it bears noting that the Court’s declaration 
that the compensation prong is non-jurisdictional appears to have 
ended a long-simmering debate about whether defendants can 
eschew the compensation prong’s dictate to plaintiffs.  Some 
commentators had encouraged courts to permit defendants to 
waive or forfeit the requirement in certain situations, thereby 
allowing Fifth Amendment takings claims to be heard in federal 
court in the first instance.99  And some courts had done exactly 
that, especially in cases that had been removed from state 
systems.100  In particular, some observers suggested that City of 
                                                                                                       
 93 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
 94 Id. at 715 (plurality opinion). 
 95 Id. at 729 (majority opinion). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. (emphasis added). 
 98 See id. at 729–33 (concluding that Florida law did not recognize petitioner’s claimed 
property interest). 
 99 See, e.g., Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1871. 
 100 See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1009 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated, 
638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Tapps Brewing Inc. v. City of Sumner, 482 F. Supp. 
2d 1218, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d sub nom. McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 
1224 (9th Cir. 2008) (assuming ripeness without deciding).  But see, e.g., Anderson v. 
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Chicago v. International College of Surgeons101 had endorsed this 
practice.102  There, a local-government defendant removed to 
federal court a suit presenting a hodge-podge of state and federal 
challenges, including both facial and as-applied Fifth Amendment 
takings claims, arising out of the denial of construction permits for 
the conversion of a historical landmark to high-rise 
condominiums.103  The Supreme Court upheld removal without 
once mentioning Williamson County (apparently echoing the 
silence of the parties on the issue104), instead focusing on whether 
the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state administrative claims was proper.105   
Of course, to the extent that any given ripeness rule represents 
a jurisdictional requirement, a federal court must dismiss claims 
that the rule renders underdeveloped, including those removed 
from state court.106  It is for this reason, apparently assuming that 
the compensation prong was meant to be jurisdictional, that one 
commentator declared that “Williamson County and City of 
Chicago are in direct conflict” and that “[e]ither City of Chicago 
erroneously permitted removal, or [it] implicitly held that the 
regulatory takings claim was ripe—a sub silentio elimination of 
the Williamson County [compensation] prong.”107  Stop the Beach 
put an end to this debate by declaring the compensation prong 
non-jurisdictional and expressly endorsing the possibility of waiver 
or forfeiture.108 
                                                                                                       
Chamberlain, 134 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The only exception to this doctrine 
is futility [of seeking state-court relief].”).   
 101 522 U.S. 156 (1997). 
 102 See, e.g., Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1871 n.322. 
 103 Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 159–60.  
 104 See Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: 
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches Self-Parody 
Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 677 & n.26 (2004) (“In fairness to the Court, it appears that the 
briefs . . . did not call Williamson County to the Court’s attention.”). 
 105 Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163 (ruling affirmatively). 
 106 See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722 
(4th ed. 2009) (“It also is well-settled that the federal right or immunity alleged by the state 
court plaintiff and argued to provide the basis for removal of the case must be the subject of 
a genuine and present controversy between the parties, not merely a possible or conjectural 
one.”).   
 107 Keller, supra note 88, at 220.  
 108 560 U.S. 702, 729 (2010).  For an excellent recent discussion of the interaction between 
Williamson County and removal doctrine, see Breemer, supra note 22, at 332–38. 
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Stop the Beach, however, provided neither an explanation nor a 
relevant citation for why the compensation prong was deemed non-
jurisdictional.109  In attempting to elucidate an answer, we must be 
careful first to understand precisely what Stop the Beach said with 
respect to the source of the rule.  That is, what did the Court mean 
by declaring the compensation prong non-jurisdictional? 
As outlined above, there are three possible solutions to the 
Williamson County ripeness puzzle: the compensation prong could 
be an Article-III-based constitutional rule, a Fifth-Amendment-
based constitutional rule, or a merely prudential rule.  In a 
footnote, Stop the Beach made clear that it was the first of these 
possibilities that it intended to reject.  Specifically, Justice Scalia 
stated that “the claim here is ripe insofar as Article III standing is 
concerned, since (accepting petitioner’s version of Florida law as 
true) petitioner has been deprived of property.”110  Nor would a 
requirement based on either of the remaining possible foundations 
for the compensation prong naturally be described as 
“jurisdictional.”  A Fifth-Amendment-based rule goes to the 
substantive merits of a takings cause of action (and is thus part 
and parcel of “actionability analysis”),111 and a prudential rule 
arises from the judiciary’s own notions of wise policy rather than 
external limitations on its adjudicatory power.112  Accordingly, 
whereas some observers view Stop the Beach as having declared 
the compensation requirement definitively prudential,113 the 
matter does not appear to be quite so clear-cut: the Court’s remark 
                                                                                                       
 109 The only citations referred to the principle that non-jurisdictional objections are 
susceptible of waiver in the Supreme Court if not presented in a respondent’s opposition to 
a petition for certiorari.  See id. (citing SUP. CT. R. 15; City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 
U.S. 808, 815–16 (1985)). 
 110 Id. at 729 n.10. 
 111 See Nichol, supra note 72, at 162; see also supra text accompanying notes 73–75.  
Nichol expressly notes that a Fifth-Amendment-based compensation requirement would be 
non-jurisdictional.  Nichol, supra note 72, at 162 (“This application of the [ripeness] doctrine 
does not relate to jurisdictional power at all.”). 
 112 See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 113 See Breemer, supra note 22, at 342 (characterizing Stop the Beach as “holding that the 
[compensation prong] is a prudential rule”); Ian Fein, Note, Why Judicial Takings Are Unripe, 
38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 749, 774 (2011) (“Over the years, there has been some uncertainty about the 
prudential or constitutional nature of the Williamson County ripeness rules.  The Court 
provided a definitive answer in Stop the Beach when all eight Justices agreed that the 
[compensation prong] was not jurisdictional . . . . The unanimous prudential declaration is 
significant . . . .”).  Fein later notes the possibility that the compensation prong may derive 
from the Fifth Amendment’s text but proceeds to reject it on the basis of the same assumption 
that Stop the Beach declared the requirement definitively prudential.  See id. at 784. 
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could be consistent with a Fifth-Amendment-based understanding 
as well. 
The Court followed with a similar statement in the 2013 case 
Horne v. Department of Agriculture.114  The question there was 
whether raisin handlers whose crop was significantly burdened by 
a federal marketing order were permitted to raise a takings claim 
as an affirmative defense to an enforcement action under the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA).115  
Invoking Williamson County, the government argued that the 
handlers were instead required to wait until the conclusion of the 
enforcement action and then pursue relief in the Court of Federal 
Claims.116  The Supreme Court stated that “[a]lthough we often 
refer to this consideration as prudential ‘ripeness,’ we have 
recognized that it is not, strictly speaking, jurisdictional.”117  For 
that proposition, the Court cited Stop the Beach and, just as there, 
included a footnote referring to the case-or-controversy 
requirement118—thus demonstrating that it was, again, the 
Article-III-based conception of the compensation prong that it 
meant to reject (albeit this time with a noncommittal nod toward a 
prudential underpinning as well). 
In light of Horne’s subsequent conclusion that 
“[p]etitioners . . . have no alternative remedy” in the Court of 
Federal Claims (owing to the interaction between the Tucker Act 
and the AMAA), such that Williamson County posed no obstacle,119 
the statement about the character of that case’s ripeness 
requirements was arguably dictum.120  But it also bears noting 
that the Court proceeded to declare that “it would make little 
sense to require the party to pay the fine in one proceeding and 
then turn around and sue for recovery of that same money in 
another proceeding”121—a remarkable statement in light of the fact 
that Williamson County requires a similar sort of piecemeal 
process.  Although Horne did not note the relevance of Williamson 
County to this point, it is difficult to see how the Court’s conclusion 
                                                                                                       
 114 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013). 
 115 Id. at 2061. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 2062 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118 Id. at 2062 & n.6. 
 119 Id. at 2063. 
 120 See id. 
 121 Id. at 2063. 
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could square with anything other than a prudential understanding 
of the compensation prong (such that it would not apply to, at 
least, some claims against the federal government).  Indeed, some 
scholars have read the case in that manner.122  Again, however, 
that inference is fairly opaque, and the Court’s treatment of the 
issue was quite conclusory. 
To sum up, following many years of confusion and some debate, 
the Supreme Court has recently stated that Williamson County’s 
compensation requirement should not be conceptualized as a 
ripeness rule grounded in Article III.  Instead, the Court has 
suggested, the rule should be viewed as a purely prudential 
mandate.123  But in making those moves, the Court has mostly 
failed to explain why prudential considerations supply a better 
solution to the ripeness puzzle than does Article III—not to 
mention the text of the Fifth Amendment.  The remainder of this 
Article offers some considerations for attempting to fill that gap.   
IV.  THE SOLUTION 
Williamson County and San Remo Hotel opened a Pandora’s box 
of unforeseen complications, spawning many more questions than 
they purported to answer.  Worse still, several of these questions 
appear more or less unanswerable using the few and sometimes 
incompatible analytical tools supplied by the Supreme Court so 
far.  Examples, discussed in turn below, include (1) whether so-
called “facial” regulatory-takings claims are subject to the 
compensation prong, (2) whether diversity and supplemental 
jurisdiction are available in federal court for prerequisite state 
causes of action, (3) whether litigants attempting to raise Fifth 
Amendment takings claims in state courts must satisfy the 
                                                                                                       
 122 See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 22, at 339–40 (citing Horne as an example of Supreme 
Court’s “le[ading] the way in the repositioning of Williamson County as a discretionary, 
prudential ripeness doctrine”); Michael W. McConnell, Horne and the Normalization of 
Takings Litigation: A Response to Professor Echeverria, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS d10749, 10751 (2013) (stating that if Horne’s remark that “the takings claim 
logically must accrue . . . ‘once the government has taken private property without paying 
for it’ . . . is true, . . . [then] Williamson County . . . cannot be correct, at least on its own 
terms” and that, instead, “its justification must necessarily rest on federalism” (quoting 
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062 n.6) (quoting another source) (some internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 123 The circuit courts seem to be following suit.  See Breemer, supra note 22, at 340–42. 
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requirement, and (4) how claim preclusion could operate in this 
context, particularly in state courts. 
 In attempting to justify the Supreme Court’s recent statements 
on the subject, this Part explores these questions in light of all 
three potential sources of the compensation prong—Article III, the 
Fifth Amendment, and prudential considerations.  I propose that 
resolving the Williamson County ripeness puzzle in favor of a 
prudential reading provides the best possible answers for these 
questions—and likely for other open questions as well.  In this 
context, constitutional rules are incapable of adapting to the 
context of specific cases.  Prudential rules, by contrast, are 
substantially more flexible.  They are amenable to exceptions, for 
instance, where the policy rationales that they were intended to 
promote are not implicated or where countervailing concerns 
predominate.124  Indeed, the questions outlined above largely turn 
on the possibility of exceptions, either actual or functional, to the 
compensation prong.  Viewing the requirement as prudential 
permits a comparison of competing considerations in the context of 
specific cases and, ultimately, allows courts to avoid some of the 
most surprising and senseless potential implications of alternative 
understandings.125 
A.  JUSTIFYING A PRUDENTIAL COURSE 
1. Facial Claims.  Courts have long distinguished between 
facial and as-applied Fifth Amendment takings claims, as seen in 
San Remo Hotel.126  Traditionally, as a Ninth Circuit panel 
explained in the takings context, “a facial challenge alleges that 
the statute or regulation is unconstitutional in the abstract: that 
‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be 
valid,’ ”127 whereas an as-applied challenge “asserts that a statute 
                                                                                                       
 124 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1013 (1992) (“[W]e do not think 
it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here.”). 
 125 For an insightful, recent, and related argument, see generally Breemer, supra note 22, 
which explores the distinction between Article-III-based and prudential understandings of 
the compensation prong in the contexts of removal and federal-court claim preclusion. 
 126 See 545 U.S. 346, 346 (2005). 
 127 Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2009) (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)), vacated, 638 F.3d 
1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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or regulation ‘infringe[s] constitutional freedoms in the 
circumstances of the particular case.’ ”128   
It has generally been thought that, Williamson County 
notwithstanding, takings plaintiffs remain free to raise facial Fifth 
Amendment challenges in federal courts in the first instance.129  
But a constitutional reading of the compensation prong may 
capture those litigants as well, thereby nullifying any shortcuts 
previously provided by attaching the “facial” label to certain 
theories of recovery. 
As Professor Sterk explains, the federal judiciary has 
traditionally classified a number of distinct forms of takings claims 
as facial.130  First is the claim that regulations “do[ ] not 
substantially advance legitimate government interests.”131  For 
years, this constituted the predominant type of facial takings 
challenge, including in San Remo Hotel.132  To the surprise of 
many observers, however, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
decided just a month before San Remo Hotel, the Supreme Court 
declared that previous opinions suggesting the validity of such 
claims had been mistaken.133  Other categorical proscriptions 
viewed as giving rise to putatively facial regulatory-takings claims 
include,134 first, permanent physical occupations of property.135  
Second are denials of all economically viable use of subject 
property.136  Third are exactions in exchange for development 
                                                                                                       
 128 Id. at 1013 (quoting United States v. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc., 404 U.S. 
561, 565 (1972)). 
 129 See, e.g., David Zhou, Comment, Rethinking the Facial Takings Claim, 120 YALE L.J. 
967, 972–73 (2011). 
 130 See Sterk, supra note 92, at 265–71. 
 131 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
 132 See 545 U.S. 323, 345 (2005) (calling this claim “the heart of [the] complaint”). 
 133 See 544 U.S. 528, 545–48 (2005) (holding that this type of facial claim “is not a valid 
takings test”).  Incidentally, the landmark takings case Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005), was also decided that Term.  A number of scholars have commented on the 
significance of the Court deciding three such monumental takings cases in quick succession.  
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, Keynote Address, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo Hotel: Takings 
Law Now Belongs to the States, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 767, 770–72 (2006). 
 134 See Sterk, supra note 92, at 267–68 (noting Supreme Court’s development of three per 
se rules). 
 135 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982). 
 136 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (finding such action a 
taking unless “the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were 
not part of his title to begin with”). 
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approval that lack an adequate nexus to the justifications 
underlying review of the proposal at issue.137   
As Professor Sterk explains, however, those groups of claims 
diverge from the traditional conception of facial challenges because 
they do not necessarily argue that the challenged governmental 
action is always and forever unconstitutional.138  For example, it is 
not flatly illegal for the government to occupy your property, even 
on a permanent basis: it merely may not do so without affording 
you just compensation (and meeting the Fifth Amendment’s 
public-use requirement).  Rather, those categories are classified as 
facial because they are not thought to depend on the traditional 
primary factor for determining whether an as-applied regulatory 
taking has occurred—“[t]he economic impact of the regulation on 
the claimant.”139  In these suits, a court can find a taking and 
require the government to compensate the aggrieved property 
owner regardless of the magnitude of his economic injury.140 
In Yee v. City of Escondido, the Supreme Court seemed 
definitively to declare that facial takings claims are not subject to 
Williamson County’s ripeness requirements: “While respondent is 
correct that a claim that the ordinance effects a regulatory taking 
as applied to petitioners’ property would be unripe [under 
Williamson County], petitioners mount a facial challenge to the 
ordinance.”141  The matter is not so simple, though.   
The claim at issue in Yee was of the “substantially advances” 
type dispatched by Lingle.142  The Yee Court thus declared that 
“[a]s this allegation does not depend on the extent to which 
petitioners are deprived of the economic use of their particular 
pieces of property or the extent to which these particular 
petitioners are compensated, petitioners’ facial challenge is ripe” 
under Williamson County.143  The three types of claims that 
                                                                                                       
 137 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).  In Stop the Beach, the 
Supreme Court listed three types of regulatory-takings claims—the first two above and the 
“recharacteriz[ation] as public property what was previously private property.”  560 U.S. 
702, 713 (2010) (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163–65 
(1980)).   
 138 Sterk, supra note 92, at 268. 
 139 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 140 Sterk, supra note 92, at 268. 
 141 503 U.S. 519, 533–34 (1992). 
 142 Id. at 534 (“[Petitioners] allege in this Court that the ordinance does not substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 143 Id. (emphasis added). 
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survived Lingle (permanent physical occupations, denials of all 
economically viable use, and attenuated exactions) are “facial” “in 
one sense,” Sterk notes, because their “success . . . does not depend 
on the economic impact visited on the particular landowner,” thus 
satisfying Yee’s first rationale for eschewing initial state-court 
adjudication under Williamson County.144  But they would appear 
to fail the second rationale—that the claim does “ ‘not depend 
on . . . the extent to which the[ ] particular petitioners are 
compensated.’ ”145 
The question thus stands whether the remaining classes of 
“facial” claims are subject to Williamson County’s compensation 
prong, requiring routing through state-court systems (and thus 
rendering any advantages of labeling such claims facial for 
jurisdictional purposes nugatory).146  The circuits have split over 
the issue,147 for the most part answering initially in the negative148 
and subsequently in the affirmative.149  The Supreme Court has 
not addressed the matter directly, and San Remo Hotel sheds little 
light on the question, despite suggesting that filing facial takings 
claims in federal court in the first instance may be proper.150  That 
is because the facial claims at issue there were of the 
“substantially advances” type declared ripe by Yee but void by 
Lingle, as the Court noted.151 
                                                                                                       
 144 Sterk, supra note 92, at 268. 
 145 Id. at 266 (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 534). 
 146 See id. at 269–70. 
 147 See id. at 269 n.105. 
 148 See Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 92–100 (2d Cir. 1992); Hall v. 
City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1281 n.28 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 149 See, e.g., Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 91–92 (1st Cir. 
2003); Daniel v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 282 
F.3d 1196 (2002); McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d 313, 317 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1995); see also S. Pac. 
Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 150 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 345–46 
(2005) (“Petitioners were never required to ripen the heart of their complaint—the claim 
that the [regulation at issue] was facially invalid because it failed to substantially advance 
a legitimate state interest—in state court.  Petitioners therefore could have raised most of 
their facial takings challenges . . . directly in federal court.” (citation omitted)). 
 151 Id. at 345 n.25 (“In all events, petitioners may no longer advance such claims given our 
recent holding that the ‘substantially advances formula is not a valid takings test, and 
indeed . . . has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.’ ” (quoting Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005))).  In fact, the Court’s phrasing that “most” (and 
therefore assumedly not all) of the hotel owners’ facial challenges “by their nature 
requested relief distinct from the provision of ‘just compensation’ ” and could therefore have 
been raised “directly in federal court,” id. at 345–46, may support the reading that post-
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The answer to this question turns on where the compensation 
prong comes from.  Because the post-Lingle categories of facial 
regulatory-takings claims hinge to some extent on whether the 
plaintiff has received just compensation, he simply does not have a 
mature claim, jurisdictionally or on the merits, under a reading 
grounded in Article III or the Fifth Amendment, respectively, until 
he has sought compensation in state court.  But given a prudential 
understanding of the compensation prong, we are free to take up 
Professor Sterk’s suggestion that whether such challenges satisfy 
Williamson County “should ultimately be determined by reference 
to the purposes of those requirements.”152 
Specifically, Sterk explains, “because takings jurisprudence 
depends so heavily on state property law, the Supreme Court has 
effectively—if implicitly—delegated development of takings 
doctrine to the state courts.”153  On the one hand, facial federal 
takings claims generally do not trigger that federalism concern 
because they do not rest on any intimate understanding of state 
law.154  Accordingly, “one may reasonably argue for dispensing 
with the [compensation prong] and permitting a landowner to 
proceed directly to federal court.”155  On the other hand, Sterk 
identifies a number of countervailing concerns that push in the 
opposite direction, including the existence of an exception to one of 
the rules that requires an examination of background property 
law156 and, more generally, the difficulty of accurately 
characterizing certain takings claims before engaging in extensive 
factual development (and the waste of resources that postponing a 
decision on the appropriate forum could accordingly entail).157   
                                                                                                       
Lingle facial claims are indeed subject to the Williamson County compensation 
requirement. 
 152 Sterk, supra note 90, at 270. 
 153 Id. at 286. 
 154 See id. at 299 (“Consider, for instance, the rule that permanent physical occupations 
always require compensation.  Application of the rule requires no investigation of background 
state law.  Similarly, the Nollan/Dolan nexus rule requires little understanding of 
background state law.  Nollan and Dolan require a court to evaluate whether the exaction 
demanded by the municipality as a condition for development is reasonably related to the 
justification that entitled the municipality to restrict development in the first place.  That 
evaluation is entirely independent of background state law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–31 (1992)). 
 157 See id. at 299–300. 
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Balancing these and other concerns—whether as a categorical 
matter or in any given case—may amount to a difficult task.  But 
my point is that only by characterizing the compensation prong as 
prudential in nature can courts perform this task, which may 
prove valuable in providing a federal-court backstop for the 
consideration of certain takings claims, at all. 
2.  Diversity and Supplemental Jurisdiction.  Two common ways 
for plaintiffs who would otherwise find themselves confined to 
state court to gain access to the federal judiciary are via the 
exercise of diversity jurisdiction158 and the assumption of 
supplemental jurisdiction over a state cause of action attached to 
another claim cognizable in a federal forum.159  Is it possible for 
would-be federal takings litigants functionally (though not 
formally) to circumvent Williamson County’s compensation prong 
by submitting the required predicate state claims to a federal 
tribunal through one of those mechanisms? 
One scholar has expressly posed this “difficult question” as it 
relates to diversity jurisdiction.160  Of course, in order to avail 
themselves of this possibility, plaintiffs would have to meet the 
amount-in-controversy and citizenship requirements, but those 
obstacles would seem surmountable in a great many cases, 
especially those involving corporations.  And although federal 
courts would be bound by state property law under the Rules of 
Decision Act,161 plaintiffs may nevertheless believe that a federal 
court would provide a more sympathetic forum—either on account 
of the general rationales underlying diversity jurisdiction or 
                                                                                                       
 158 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States . . . .”). 
 159 See generally id. § 1367(a) (“Except as . . . expressly provided otherwise by [later 
provisions of this statute or another], in any civil action of which the district courts have 
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.”). 
 160 See Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1868–70 (arguing that diversity jurisdiction should not 
be exercised in this context). 
 161 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution 
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases 
where they apply.”); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in 
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied 
in any case is the law of the State.”). 
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because some may think that federal judges are more willing to 
vindicate private-property rights than are their state 
counterparts.162   
As a number of cases reflect, whether a federal court’s exercise 
of diversity jurisdiction over the initial claims required by 
Williamson County runs afoul of the spirit of the compensation 
prong remains uncertain.163  Given that such claims do indeed 
press the required state causes of action, the answer may appear 
to be an obvious “no.”  But allowing plaintiffs to evade Williamson 
County in this manner could undercut the state-protective 
concerns articulated in San Remo Hotel to a significant degree, 
subtracting what might amount to a great many local land-use 
disputes from the dockets of the reportedly more competent state 
courts.164 
Similar issues attend the prospect of a federal court exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state causes of action required 
by Williamson County in conjunction with sufficiently related 
claims with independent bases for federal jurisdiction.165  
Consider, for instance, that a clever plaintiff could attempt to 
append a state compensation claim to a facial federal takings 
claim (assuming that the latter can be brought in federal court in 
the first instance, as discussed above).  Any preclusive 
consequences caused by deciding the state cause of action prior to 
an as-applied federal claim would be generated by the federal 
court where the plaintiff wanted to litigate in the first place.  Like 
with respect to diversity jurisdiction, therefore, the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction over the class of state claims required by 
Williamson County would come at the cost of the state-court 
expertise that San Remo Hotel regarded as so important. 
Turning to the puzzle we hope to solve here, a constitutional 
reading of the compensation prong would appear to admit of no 
                                                                                                       
 162 See Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1869 (suggesting that federal judges may be more 
willing to protect private-property rights for ideological reasons). 
 163 Compare, e.g., SK Fin. SA v. La Plata Cnty., 126 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(concluding that it does not), with CBS Outdoor Inc. v. N.J. Transit Corp., No. 06-2428 
(HAA), 2007 WL 2509633, at *23 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007) (declining to decide issue where 
diversity was improperly pleaded for other reasons). 
 164 See Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1869–70. 
 165 Cf. id. at 1870 n.317 (citing Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 934 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(dismissing supplemental state inverse-condemnation claims where appended to unripe 
federal takings claim); CBS Outdoor, 2007 WL 2509633, at *23 (holding supplemental 
jurisdiction over regulatory-takings claims improper after dismissal of diversity claims)). 
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preference as to where the predicate state suits required by 
Williamson County are heard.  Under an Article-III-based or Fifth-
Amendment-based understanding of the compensation prong, 
federal courts should be able to exercise diversity and 
supplemental jurisdiction over those suits whenever the statutory 
requirements for doing so have been satisfied, paying little or no 
mind to the state-respecting sentiments expressed by San Remo 
Hotel.  A prudential understanding of the requirement, in contrast, 
provides a more nuanced range of options for courts to consider. 
The exercise of diversity jurisdiction over the initial state 
claims required by Williamson County presents, in a sense, the 
trickiest issue examined here.  On the one hand, the entire point of 
forcing plaintiffs into state court, on a prudential view of the 
compensation prong, is to allow the supposedly better-suited state 
judiciary to take the first pass at disputes intimately intertwined 
with local land-use law.  That objective falls flat where such claims 
are heard in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, despite the 
fact that state property law still governs.  On the other hand, our 
judicial system has long accorded great respect to the justifications 
undergirding diversity jurisdiction, and litigants are traditionally 
not required to prove an actual need for the protections that such 
jurisdiction provides.166  To the extent that certain subject areas 
could be carved out of the scope of diversity jurisdiction, the state 
causes of action required by Williamson County would be plausible 
candidates.  But, more realistically, such claims appear fully open 
to federal-court adjudication.  A prudential view of the 
compensation prong perhaps renders abstention or certification to 
state high courts appropriate alternatives for federal courts to 
consider in some cases.  But how frequently federal courts can 
properly invoke abstention doctrines when confronted with run-of-
the-mill takings claims is itself a hotly contested issue.167 
                                                                                                       
 166 See, e.g., Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The courts 
should not use our own judgments about when the purposes of diversity jurisdiction are 
met . . . .”); Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharm. Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d 392, 396 
(5th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e may not bar a plaintiff . . . from access to the federal courts because 
we conclude that he is unlikely to encounter any bias in state court . . . .”). 
 167 Compare, e.g., Int’l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 
1998) (“[E]ven in cases involving state land use issues, a district court must not decline 
jurisdiction where its exercise ‘would . . . not require the District Court to guess at the 
resolution of uncertain and difficult issues of state law.’ ” (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 187 (1959))), on remand from 522 U.S. 156 (1997), with 
Pomponio v. Fauquier Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319, 1327 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Over 
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The possibility that federal courts could exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state-law claims mandated by Williamson 
County presents a similar mix of concerns but ultimately appears 
amenable to a simpler solution.  Federal courts have a strong 
interest in adjudicating disputes that implicate federal rights in 
some fundamental way, both in the first instance and as unified 
sets.  Like with respect to diversity, however, granting the 
predicate state suits required by the compensation prong easy 
access to federal court may undermine the rule’s federalism-based 
justifications to a considerable extent.  It is significant, therefore, 
that (unlike with respect to diversity) federal courts have fairly 
broad discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.168  
Hence, a prudential understanding of the compensation prong may 
point in favor of permitting the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction over Williamson County’s required state claims only 
occasionally, while relegating the majority to state court.  In 
particular, in order to prevent the sort of circumvention mentioned 
previously, supplemental jurisdiction would be most appropriate 
where the state claims in question interconnect with issues 
implicating federal rights that are neither limited to nor 
dominated by takings claims. 
3.  State-Court Litigants.  San Remo Hotel recognized and 
accepted the fact that its holding might prevent a large proportion 
of Fifth Amendment litigants from ever reaching federal court.169  
                                                                                                       
frequent objections and challenges and in practically every instance, we have held that, 
absent unusual circumstances, a district court should abstain . . . from exercising its 
jurisdiction in cases arising solely out of state or local zoning or land use law, despite 
attempts to disguise the issues as federal claims.”), overruled on other grounds by 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728–31 (1996). 
 168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if—(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) 
the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has 
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdictions, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 
declining jurisdiction.”). 
 169 To be clear, as suggested with respect to Horne, it is generally assumed that plaintiffs 
challenging a putative taking by the federal government (as opposed to a state or local 
entity) can bring suit under the Fifth Amendment in the first instance in the Court of 
Federal Claims.  See, e.g., Fein, supra note 113, at 783.  But see McConnell, supra note 122, 
at 10750–51 (“It makes no sense to say that the constitutional violation does not occur until 
after the party seeks and is denied compensation in the Court of Federal Claims, because 
the claimant cannot sue under the Tucker Act except for a constitutional violation, which 
must have occurred before he can sue. Instead, the takings claim logically must accrue, as 
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But the Court assumed—clearly in dictum—that parties could 
raise their federal takings claims in state systems, unhampered by 
Williamson County.  Specifically, the majority stated that it 
“reject[ed] petitioners’ contention that Williamson County 
prohibits plaintiffs from advancing their [as-applied] federal 
claims in state courts.”170  State courts are not necessarily barred 
from “hearing simultaneously a plaintiff’s request for 
compensation under state law and the claim that, in the 
alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth 
Amendment,” Justice Stevens stated, concluding that a contrary 
determination would require property owners to “ ‘resort to 
piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures.’ ”171   
But how, doctrinally, could that be so?  Is it not the case that, as 
one scholar has put it, “[t]he federal takings claim simply does not 
exist before the state inverse condemnation claim is resolved”?172    
For the reasons explained below, it appears that if the Williamson 
County compensation prong were considered constitutional in 
nature (again, as springing from either Article III or the Fifth 
Amendment), it would likely apply to all or many state-court 
plaintiffs in the same manner as it applies to federal-court 
plaintiffs—making Fifth Amendment claims unfit for even state 
courts prior to a separate suit seeking just compensation.   
To understand why this is so with respect to an Article-III-
based understanding of the compensation prong, we must first ask 
whether and how justiciability doctrines control the adjudication of 
federal causes of action heard under concurrent jurisdiction in 
state courts.173  While state justiciability law is generally thought 
to predominate even where the claim is federal, that proposition 
                                                                                                       
the Horne Court explained, ‘once the government has taken private property without paying 
for it.’ ” (quoting 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 n.6 (2013))). 
 170 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 346 (2005). 
 171 Id. (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 350 n.7 (1986)).  
Incidentally, it seems somewhat ironic for the majority to lament forcing plaintiffs to “resort 
to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures” when that is precisely what the 
petitioners, id. at 338, and the separate opinion, id. at 350–51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring 
in the judgment), argued that the majority’s result did. 
 172 Kovacs, supra note 89, at 18. 
 173 Litigants bringing federal takings claims in state court will generally use § 1983 as a 
vehicle.  The Supreme Court recognized concurrent state jurisdiction over such claims in 
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980). 
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has generated significant controversy,174 with several scholars 
arguing—on the strength of Article III and/or the Supremacy 
Clause—that state jurisdiction over federal causes of action cannot 
be broader than the scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction as shaped by federal justiciability principles.175  The 
question whether federal law (including Williamson County) 
controls of its own force, at least at the margins, thus remains 
subject to debate.   
Even if state justiciability law governs, a range of approaches 
would be possible.  First, a state could choose to borrow federal 
justiciability doctrine as the measure of its own.176  Second, a 
state’s justiciability requirements could equal or exceed those set 
by federal law, shutting out the same or a broader range of 
plaintiffs.177  Or, finally, state justiciability law could be more 
lenient than its federal counterpart, affording a greater number of 
litigants their day in court.178  Only in the last scenario would it be 
possible that a state court could assume jurisdiction over a federal 
takings claim that did not satisfy Williamson County. 
Alternatively, the compensation prong could be a Fifth-
Amendment-based ripeness requirement.  In essence, it could 
articulate a necessary element of a claim that the Takings Clause 
                                                                                                       
 174 See Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2011) 
(“One of the principal tensions in federal jurisdiction is between the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
role as guardian of federal supremacy and the independent authority of state courts to 
adjudicate federal substantive rights without having to heed federal jurisdictional 
constraints.”). 
 175 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court 
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 282–84 (1990); Paul J. Katz, 
Comment, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing Doctrine, and the 
Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1340–49 (2005). 
 176 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement 
of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1008 (2001) 
(“Surely some states follow Article III standing . . . .”). 
 177 See, e.g., id. at 1006 (noting that state “courts customarily decline to rule on questions 
of law absent something like a case or controversy” (citing Brown Mech. Contractors v. 
Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 1983); Estes v. Walters, 601 S.W.2d 252 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1980); Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980))); Maria 
Farinella, Comment, The Clean Air Act of 1990: Title V’s Operating Permit Provision for 
Citizen Access to State Court Judicial Review, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 67, 84–87 (1994) 
(recounting Virginia legislature’s imposition of standing requirements more restrictive than 
those of Article III on certain environmental plaintiffs). 
 178 See, e.g., Me. Ass’n of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Comm’r, 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 
(1st Cir. 1989) (stating that Maine’s standing law is more liberal than federal standing law); 
Langford v. Superior Court, 729 P.2d 822, 833 n.6 (Cal. 1987) (“California’s [standing] 
requirements are less stringent than those imposed by federal law.”). 
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has been violated: without a denial of just compensation in state 
court, the plaintiff does not have a full-fledged cause of action.  
Here there is little room for disputing that state as well as federal 
courts would be constitutionally disempowered from entertaining 
federal regulatory-takings claims absent pursuit of a predicate 
state cause of action.  If the Supreme Court has declared certain 
procedures mandated by the very text of the Fifth Amendment, 
inferior courts may not disagree.  While states are free to enshrine 
greater protections for private-property rights in their own 
constitutions, they cannot formulate their own elements for federal 
Fifth Amendment claims—nor may they disregard elements 
established by the Supreme Court. 
How would viewing the compensation prong as prudential 
change the scenario?  The prudential purpose of the rule, as stated 
in San Remo Hotel, is to provide state courts a first pass at takings 
challenges prior to their potential adjudication in federal court.  
This rationale does not justify requiring plaintiffs who wish (or 
are, as a consequence of San Remo Hotel, effectively required) to 
litigate both their federal and state takings claims in state court to 
pursue two distinct sets of claims.  If such a litigant asserts the 
state cause of action mandated by the compensation prong 
simultaneously with her ultimate Fifth Amendment claim, the 
policy principles expressed in San Remo Hotel are still obtained, as 
state courts will continue to “bear primary responsibility for 
policing land-use regulations.”179  And the savings to judicial and 
litigant resources nearly go without saying. 
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to have endorsed this 
point in his San Remo Hotel concurrence, albeit very briefly.  In a 
footnote responding to the majority’s assertion that Williamson 
County does not require state litigants to proceed in piecemeal 
fashion, Rehnquist stated that plaintiffs would be permitted to 
raise federal takings claims simultaneously with state causes of 
action only if Williamson County’s compensation prong “is merely 
a prudential rule, and not a constitutional mandate”—a question 
he criticized the majority for “conspicuously le[aving] open.”180   
4.  Claim Preclusion.  San Remo Hotel focused exclusively on 
issue preclusion (or “collateral estoppel,” in common-law 
                                                                                                       
 179 Sterk, supra note 92, at 286. 
 180 545 U.S. 323, 351–52 n.2 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see 
supra text accompanying note 87. 
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speak)181—the rule that “once a court has decided an issue of fact 
or law necessary to its judgment, that decision . . . preclude[s] 
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action 
involving a party to the first case.”182  Several perceptive scholars, 
however, have noted that San Remo Hotel’s reasoning, with its 
categorical hostility to judicially crafted exceptions to the Full 
Faith and Credit Statute, must extend to the blunter instrument 
of claim preclusion (or “res judicata”) as well,183 given that inter-
system claim-preclusion principles also derive from § 1738.184  
Under claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an 
action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating 
issues that were or could have been raised in that action.”185   
As an initial matter, it is worth exploring whether the 
distinction between claim and issue preclusion is one without a 
difference in this context.  That is, would issue preclusion by itself 
effectively foreclose later federal-court adjudication of Fifth 
Amendment takings claims, or would there still be room left for 
claim preclusion to operate?   
Professor Sterk argues the latter position.186  He begins by 
demonstrating that the issue-preclusive effects of a state-court 
denial of just compensation will generally require outright 
dismissal of subsequent federal takings claims only where issues 
of “ultimate fact”—that is, the application of law to fact—are 
sufficiently similar in the state and federal proceedings.187  That 
condition obviously obtained in San Remo Hotel itself, where the 
                                                                                                       
 181 San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 327 n.1 (“[O]ur grant of certiorari was limited exclusively 
to [a] question [concerning] issue preclusion . . . .”). 
 182 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
 183 See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 22, at 328–32; Fletcher, supra note 133, at 775; Kovacs, 
supra note 89, at 14; Lindberg, supra note 90, at 1841; Sterk, supra note 92, at 276–83. 
 184 See Allen, 449 U.S. at 96. 
 185 Id. at 94. 
 186 See Sterk, supra note 92, at 271–83. 
 187 Issue-preclusion doctrine generally applies to three types of determinations: 
evidentiary fact, law, and “ultimate fact.”  Id. at 273 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982)).  As Sterk explains, 
Issue preclusion presents the greatest threat to federal takings claims 
when the state court has made a determination of ultimate fact, for 
instance, a determination that the fee imposed on the hotel’s owner was 
reasonably related to the number of units designated for conversion.  When 
a determination of ultimate fact is critical—as it was in San Remo—for 
both the state and the federal takings claim, issue preclusion doctrine could 
require . . . outright dismissal of the federal takings claim. 
Id. at 274. 
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California Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution’s 
takings provision as “congruent” with its federal counterpart.188  
As Sterk explains, however, many state takings causes of action 
are resolved on state-specific grounds that do not require courts to 
consider issues of ultimate fact paralleling Fifth Amendment 
analysis.189  “As a result, issue preclusion doctrine . . . would leave 
many federal takings claims open to federal litigation even after 
the state courts have finally rejected state takings claims.”190   
Nevertheless, Sterk contends, “the gaps left open by issue 
preclusion doctrine will quickly be closed by claim preclusion 
principles.”191  Because the measure of preclusion under § 1738 is 
the law of the judgment-rendering state, the question becomes 
whether state preclusion rules tolerate bifurcated (or “split,” as the 
terminology goes) actions: first, an inverse-condemnation or other 
claim seeking compensation under state law and, second, a federal 
takings claim.192  While the contours of preclusion law may vary 
from state to state, the majority standard would seem to be the 
“transactional” test outlined in § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, which provides that claim preclusion extinguishes “all 
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with 
respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected 
transactions, out of which the [initial] action arose.”193  The 
Restatement’s commentary explains that “the concept of a 
transaction is here used in [a] broad sense” as “connot[ing] a 
natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts.”194   
Federal takings claims and the state predicates required by 
Williamson County will obviously arise out of a common nucleus of 
operative facts, rendering the latter potentially preclusive of the 
former in states that subscribe to the majority approach.  
Consequently, Sterk concludes, claim preclusion should keep more 
takings challenges out of federal court than would the issue-
                                                                                                       
 188 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 332 (2005) 
(quoting 41 P.3d 87, 100–01 (Cal. 2002)). 
 189 As examples, Sterk mentions a New York doctrine barring challenges to restrictions in 
place at the time the relevant property was purchased by the challenger, as well as a New 
Jersey principle holding that no taking has occurred where the application of a regulation to 
the plaintiff’s property is invalidated for arbitrariness.  Sterk, supra note 92, at 275–76. 
 190 Id. at 254. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See id. at 281. 
 193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982). 
 194 Id. § 24 cmt. b. 
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preclusion principles on which San Remo Hotel relied.195  The rule 
articulated there is accordingly broader than it initially appears.  
The ominous result, says Sterk: “a nearly insurmountable obstacle 
for claimants seeking federal court litigation of federal takings 
claims.”196 
The foregoing is by now relatively uncontroversial with respect 
to federal courts.  Further issues concerning whether and how 
claim preclusion ought to operate in state systems confronted with 
federal regulatory-takings claims, however, have gone largely 
unexamined.  In particular, if state litigants are subject to the 
compensation prong, such that they must seek payment under 
state causes of action in an initial round of litigation before 
pressing their federal claims in a subsequent round, how might 
claim preclusion operate on the second suit?  If claim preclusion 
could block assertion of follow-up Fifth Amendment claims in both 
state and federal court, could it be that some “[f]ederal takings 
claims . . . go from green to rotten without ever being ripe”?197 
Because the measure of inter-system preclusion under § 1738 is 
the intra-system preclusion law of the judgment-rendering state, 
claim-preclusion principles ought to operate against federal 
takings challenges brought subsequent to the claims mandated by 
Williamson County in state courts to the same extent as in federal 
courts.  And therein lies the little-noticed rub—perhaps one of the 
ultimate jurisprudential Catch-22s: bifurcation could be 
simultaneously required and verboten in both federal and state 
systems for the reasons described above.198 
In assessing this hypothesis, two qualifications to the general 
principles of claim preclusion warrant scrutiny.  For the sake of 
                                                                                                       
 195 Moreover, a state court cannot attempt to soften this sort of blow by stating that its 
judgments should have less preclusive effect in federal courts.  See Thomas v. Washington 
Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 285–86 (1980); see also Sterk, supra note 92, at 282.   
 196 Sterk, supra note 92, at 276–77.  That possibility has been labeled “certiorari only” 
because of the prospect that litigating a federal takings claim from a state system up to the 
U.S. Supreme Court may be the only avenue to federal review.  Lindberg, supra note 90, at 
1841. 
 197 Martinez & Martinez, supra note 80, at 451 (stating hypothetical but rejecting it as 
incorrect interpretation of precedent). 
 198 Alternate, minority standards may or may not capture such closely related claims, but 
it stands to reason that many would.  Moreover, under general “reverse-Erie” principles, so 
long as states apply procedural rules (such as the law of claim preclusion) evenhandedly 
between state and federal causes of action, the fact that an entire class of federal claims 
may be barred from state courts does not present any particular federalism concern.  See 
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 141–46 (1988). 
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simplicity, I discuss these issues as they are framed in the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments.  First, § 26(1)(c) provides that 
if “[t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case 
or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action 
because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
courts,” § 24’s general rule “does not apply to extinguish the 
claim.”199  Accordingly, if Williamson County’s compensation 
requirement could be deemed to articulate a subject-matter-
jurisdiction rule, claim preclusion might not bar the litigation of a 
federal takings challenge after the litigation of a prerequisite state 
cause of action.200  As discussed above, if the requirement arises 
from the Constitution in the first place, it could fairly be 
considered “jurisdictional” only if the specific source were Article 
III rather than the Fifth Amendment.201  The question, then, 
becomes whether Article III justiciability doctrines, including 
ripeness rules, are limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction.   
Justiciability need not be treated as an aspect of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.202  Both inquiries can be described as “jurisdictional” 
because they relate to whether a given tribunal has the authority 
to adjudicate a given dispute.  But whereas justiciability doctrines 
“define the institutional role of the . . . judiciary with respect 
to . . . the other branches of . . . government” and thus “preserve 
the ideal of separation of powers,”203 subject-matter jurisdiction 
defines the institutional roles of various courts within the 
                                                                                                       
 199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1982) (emphasis added). 
 200 In full, § 26(1)(c) applies to claims that were initially foreclosed by “the limitations on 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain 
multiple theories or demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action.”   Id. 
(emphasis added).  The comments make clear that the latter portion denotes the possible 
persistence of “formal inhibitions imposed by the historical division between ‘law’ and 
‘equity,’ or the forms of action, or related procedural modes.”  Id. at cmt. c(2).  All that 
remains is the catch-all exception for situations in which a plaintiff can “clearly and 
convincingly” demonstrate that “the policies favoring preclusion of a second action are 
overcome for an extraordinary reason, such as the apparent invalidity of a continuing 
restraint or condition having a vital relation to personal liberty or the failure of the prior 
litigation to yield a coherent disposition of the controversy.”  Id. § 26(1)(f). 
 201 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 202 See Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 526–27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (“That a plaintiff makes a claim that is not justiciable because committed to 
executive discretion does not mean the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his case, 
as the opinion of the court helps to clarify.  Upon a proper motion, a court should dismiss 
the case for failure to state a claim. . . . [T]his court has been careful to distinguish between 
the two concepts.”). 
 203 Lees, supra note 59, at 1481, 1488. 
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judiciary, federal or state, vis-à-vis each other.204  Justiciability 
can thus be thought of as a threshold concern with whether courts 
in general are equipped to resolve a dispute in the abstract,205 
whereas subject-matter jurisdiction can be viewed as a logically 
subsequent inquiry into whether a particular court can actually do 
so.206 
But the matter is by no means clear-cut.  Courts often treat 
justiciability as part and parcel of subject-matter jurisdiction,207 
and some states may actually define subject-matter jurisdiction to 
include issues traditionally seen as questions of justiciability.208  
Moreover, one could argue that this distinction is overly 
formalistic—particularly given the apparent functional motivation 
of § 26(1)(c), to dilute the strong medicine of claim preclusion 
where the first court simply had no authority to hear the second 
claim.209 
                                                                                                       
 204 See id.; see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (1982).  Under 
federal law, the concepts of justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction can be seen as 
stemming from textually distinct sources, too.  Constitutional justiciability doctrines derive 
from Article III’s limitation of “[t]he judicial power” to “cases” and “controversies.”  Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968); U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.  By contrast, subject-matter 
jurisdiction derives from the nine specific categories—or subject matters—of cases and 
controversies listed in Article III, as well as from various federal statutes further delimiting 
the jurisdiction of federal courts.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, § 5.1. 
 205 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 943 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “justiciability” as “[t]he 
quality or state of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a court”); WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 62, § 3529 (“Concepts of justiciability have been developed to identify 
appropriate occasions for judicial action.”). 
 206 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 205, at 931 (defining “subject-matter 
jurisdiction” as “[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the 
extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things”). 
 207 See, e.g., Naso v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 1566, 1567 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (“A 
federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to express a legal opinion in an action 
which lacks a justiciable case or controversy.”).  Practically, this may occur in part because of 
the (arguably artificially) limited nature of the categories of so-called “jurisdictional” defects 
for challenging a complaint by motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(b) (“[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction . . . .”); see also Oryszak, 576 F.3d at 526–27 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (contending that non-justiciable claims should be dismissed under 
Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim”). 
 208 See, e.g., State v. 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Ala. 1999) (“ ‘Standing is 
a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction.’ ” (quoting Barshop v. Medina Cnty. 
Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex. 1996))). 
 209 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. c (1982) (referring to “formal 
barriers in the way of a litigant’s presenting to a court in one action the entire claim” but 
then proceeding to specify the two sources of such barriers discussed above). 
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The second potentially relevant qualification may harken back 
to the common conception of claim preclusion as extending to 
claims that were or “could have been” raised in the initial suit, 
depending on the meaning of that phrase.210  Section 20(2) of the 
Restatement provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] valid and final 
personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on the 
prematurity of the action or on the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy a 
precondition to suit, does not bar another action by the plaintiff 
instituted after the claim has matured, or the precondition has 
been satisfied.”211  By its terms, § 20(2) applies only to a plaintiff 
who has suffered a “final personal judgment for the defendant,” 
not to one who did not attempt to assert the later claim in the first 
instance.  This raises the somewhat odd possibility that a plaintiff 
who has lost her Fifth Amendment claim may be better off than 
one who has failed to litigate it at all.212 
In any event, what really matters is the practical question 
whether there is a meaningful risk that courts would take the 
approach posited as possible here.  In light of at least one state 
high-court decision, the answer seems to be “yes.”   
 The plaintiff in Hallco Texas, Inc. v. McMullen County213 
began by attempting to raise a Fifth Amendment regulatory-
takings claim in the federal system.  The district court dismissed 
the case without prejudice for failure to satisfy the compensation 
                                                                                                       
 210 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) (1982). 
 212 Perhaps someone would argue that a notice function could be served by that 
possibility.  It is also worth noting that a broad reading of § 20(2) may conflict with the 
plain text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which provides that “[u]nless the 
dismissal order states otherwise, . . . any dismissal . . . except one for lack of 
jurisdiction . . . operates as an adjudication on the merits.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).  The 
Reporter’s Note to § 202(2) recognized that those provisions are in tension but notes that 
in 1961, “the Supreme Court stated that a dismissal for ‘failure of the plaintiff to satisfy a 
precondition’ was . . . a dismissal for lack of ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of [Rule 
41(b)].”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) Reporter’s Note (1982) (quoting 
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284–88 (1961)).  Costello, however, has been subject 
to a great deal of criticism and a number of carve-outs.  See, e.g., 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 106, § 4437 (“[Costello’s] method of manipulating Rule 41(b) is unsatisfactory on 
several counts [and] should be avoided in reasoning about any particular question.”).  It also 
seems inconsistent with the Court’s recent efforts “[t]o ward off profligate use of the term 
‘jurisdiction.’ ”  Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013).  Perhaps, 
therefore, § 20(2) should carry the most force where the relevant precondition is truly 
jurisdictional.  Then again, we ought to be wary about allowing the tail of a modern rule to 
wag the dog of what may be a long common-law tradition. 
 213 221 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2006). 
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prong.214  The plaintiff, a corporation, then proceeded to state 
court, where it lost a facial state regulatory-takings challenge.  It 
then again filed suit in state court, this time asserting as-applied 
state and federal takings claims.215  The Supreme Court of Texas 
noted that “[w]e apply the transactional approach to res judicata” 
and held that the pending state claim was precluded by the first 
state case.216  It then extended that holding to the federal claim by 
expressly expanding San Remo Hotel to claim preclusion.217  And 
although the court did not explicitly state whether the 
compensation prong applied in the state system, it noted and 
expressed no disagreement with the lower court’s assumption that 
the federal claim “was not ripe at the time [the plaintiff] filed [its] 
first [state] suit.”218 
Again, what difference would viewing the compensation prong 
as prudential in nature make?  As it turns out, the problem posed 
by claim preclusion where a plaintiff attempts to sue seriatim 
would likely remain unchanged by a prudential understanding.  
But, as discussed above, the antecedent requirement that state 
litigants must satisfy the compensation prong, and therefore 
attempt multiple rounds of litigation in the first place, could be 
lifted.  Accordingly, the most senseless possible consequences of 
claim preclusion in state systems—that bifurcation could be both 
mandatory and forbidden—could be avoided via a prudential 
solution to the Williamson County ripeness puzzle.  The same, of 
course, goes for federal courts, although because the consequences 
of claim preclusion are not as bleak in that context (assuming that 
state forums remain open to federal takings claims), the 
arguments for softening the dictates of the compensation prong 
may be less convincing.  
                                                                                                       
 214 Id. at 53–54. 
 215 Id. at 54–55. 
 216 Id. at 58–60. 
 217 Id. at 61–62.  One could argue that the Hallco court was focused more closely on the 
takings prong of Williamson County, which may have been satisfied at the time of the 
initial state filing.  But that seems overly simplistic given that the court plainly discussed 
both the takings and compensation requirements and repeatedly recognized that the federal 
court had rested its dismissal on the latter. 
 218 Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 94 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002), discussed 
in 221 S.W.3d at 56.  Among other colorful quotes, the dissent stated that “[r]ipening a 
regulatory-takings claim [has] become[ ] a costly game of ‘Mother, May I’, in which the 
landowner is allowed to take only small steps forward and backwards until exhausted.”  221 
S.W.3d at 63 (Hecht, J., dissenting).  
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B.  CONSIDERING A COUPLE OF COUNTERARGUMENTS 
 Two potential, not-yet-discussed counterarguments to the 
conclusion that the mystery surrounding the nature of the 
compensation prong should be resolved in favor of a prudential 
solution come to mind.  The first is textual and relates to the 
argument as a general matter; the second is structural and relates 
to the special concern of closing all courthouse doors in the face of 
some federal takings claimants. 
1.  Due-Process Parallels.  The Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause is worded in a strikingly similar manner to its next-door 
neighbor, the Due Process Clause.  “No person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” 
commands the Due Process Clause; “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation,” echoes the 
Takings Clause.219  Each can be read as first stating a substantive 
proscription followed by a (logically precedent) procedural 
prescription.  So, from a textualist perspective, it would perhaps be 
appealing to set up parallel analytical frameworks for evaluating 
claims under the two provisions.   
For this reason, the Supreme Court stated in Williamson County, 
“[t]he recognition that a property owner has not suffered a violation 
of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully 
attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures 
provided by the State for obtaining just compensation is analogous 
to the Court’s holding in Parratt v. Taylor.”220  Parratt, as described 
in Williamson County, ruled that “a person deprived of property 
through a random and unauthorized act by a state employee does 
not state a claim under the Due Process Clause merely by alleging 
the deprivation of property”; rather, he must also show that the 
state affirmatively denied him whatever process he was due.221  The 
counterargument, therefore, is that treating the compensation 
prong as merely prudential destroys this parallelism because the 
denial of just compensation would not necessarily be viewed as part 
and parcel of the constitutional violation (as it is in the Fifth-
Amendment-based formulation). 
                                                                                                       
 219 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 220 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) (describing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled 
on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1985)). 
 221 Id. (permitting due process to occur “postdeprivation”). 
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Two rejoinders suggest themselves.  First, perhaps the 
substantive-proscription/procedural-prescription view is itself 
faulty.  While that description clearly fits the Due Process Clause, 
the Takings Clause is more amenable to being read as substantive 
through and through.  That is, the Takings Clause can be—and, it 
appears, long was222—understood as enshrining a right not to have 
your property appropriated unless the government pays for it—
regardless of the procedural protections provided.  That 
observation supports the second, more functionalist rejoinder.  
Whereas the Parratt rule rests on a compelling policy foundation, 
there exists no rationale of comparable strength for dividing the 
time dimension over which a regulatory-takings injury occurs by 
characterizing the burdening of property as a separate event from 
the denial of just compensation.  The Supreme Court undermined 
its reliance on Parratt by essentially admitting as much in a 
Williamson County footnote,223 and others have made the point in 
various contexts.224   
Basically, Parratt permits post-deprivation process to suffice 
only where government action is “random and unauthorized.”225  
Williamson County, in contrast, permits post-deprivation process 
to suffice in all situations.226  There is a strong justification for 
tolerating that sort of process in the former context.  As the Court 
                                                                                                       
 222 See Hawley, supra note 22, at 252–54. 
 223 “The analogy to Parratt is imperfect because Parratt does not extend to 
situations . . . in which the deprivation of property is effected pursuant to an established 
state policy or procedure, and the State could provide predeprivation process.”  Williamson 
County, 473 U.S. at 195–96 n.14.  But the ensuing distinction is question-begging in light of 
the Court’s evident desire to interpret the two clauses in tandem: “Unlike the Due Process 
Clause, however, the Just Compensation Clause has never been held to require pretaking 
process or compensation.  Nor has the Court ever recognized any interest served by 
pretaking compensation that could not be equally well served by post-taking compensation.”  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 224 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 349 n.1 
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“In creating the [compensation prong], 
the Court [in Williamson County] . . . analogized to . . . Parratt v. Taylor.  As several of 
petitioners’ amici in this case have urged, th[at] case[ ] provided limited support for 
the . . . requirement.” (citations omitted)); J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson 
County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How the England Reservation, Issue Preclusion 
Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe 
Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 229–30 (2003); Keller, supra note 88, at 
218 (“Parratt should not have been extended to takings claims because the predicate for 
invoking Parratt . . . is never involved in regulatory takings claims.”). 
 225 451 U.S. at 541. 
 226 473 U.S. at 195–96 n.14. 
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stated in Parratt, “[i]n such a case, . . . the State cannot predict 
precisely when the loss will occur,” rendering it “not only 
impracticable, but impossible, to provide a meaningful hearing 
before the deprivation.”227  No similar justification supports the 
compensation prong, as regulatory takings are never random and 
unauthorized; nor are they unforeseeable in light of the fact that 
no constitutional violation can occur absent quasi-exhaustion of 
administrative remedies per Williamson County’s takings prong.228 
2.  Unreviewable Constitutional Claims.  With respect to the 
particular worry that a constitutional reading of the compensation 
prong could render some Fifth Amendment claims unfit for 
adjudication in both state and federal judicial systems by virtue of 
claim preclusion (or other doctrinal wrinkles229), one might point 
out that there are plenty of potential constitutional claims that 
cannot be vindicated in courts of law.  Among other examples in 
his dissent in Webster v. Doe,230 Justice Scalia pointed to claims 
butting up against the requirement that “[e]ach House shall be the 
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own 
Members.”231  The response to this argument should be that 
litigating the kinds of claims barred from courts altogether would 
generally run the risk of compromising critical structural 
principles of separation of powers or, perhaps, federalism.232  
Those concerns simply are not in play when it comes to disabling 
state courts from deciding federal regulatory-takings claims, 
especially given the well-established principle that such courts are 
perfectly capable of doing so in conformity to federal law.233 
Moreover, with the exception of the highly idiosyncratic and 
vague Ninth Amendment,234 I am unaware of any portion of the 
                                                                                                       
 227 451 U.S. at 541. 
 228 Incidentally, the Court has never explained why the administrative procedures 
contemplated by the takings prong are insufficient for deciding the payment question and, 
consequently, why a taking itself and the denial of just compensation associated with that 
taking should be treated as temporally distinct elements of a Fifth Amendment claim. 
 229 With respect to removal from state to federal court, see Breemer, supra note 22, at 
332–37. 
 230 486 U.S. 592, 612–13 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting. 
 231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 232 486 U.S. at 612–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 233 See Fein, supra note 113, at 786–87 (explaining assumption and collecting arguments 
on both sides). 
 234 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Constitution’s refusal to ‘deny or disparage’ other rights is far removed from affirming any 
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Bill of Rights that is regarded as wholly unfit for adjudicative 
enforcement.  There is little reason to believe that the Takings 
Clause should be an outlier among these basic liberties—or that 
the Supreme Court meant to make it one.235  Indeed, the Court has 
made clear in another context that there is “no reason why” that 
provision, “as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First 
Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the 
status of a poor relation.”236 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The expressions that various observers have conjured to 
describe this complex corner of the law would be utterly comical if 
they were not so incisive.  Takings doctrine is a “crazy-quilt 
pattern,” a “muddle,” a “welter of confusing and apparently 
incompatible results,” and a “farrago of fumblings which have 
suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories,” some 
commentators have said; the area is “liberally salted with 
paradox,” another has remarked.237  More particularly, the so-
called “Williamson County compensation prong”—a rule that 
generally forces plaintiffs pursuing Fifth Amendment regulatory-
takings challenges first to seek compensation in state court—has 
been called “deceptive, inherently nonsensical, draconian, and a 
Kafkaesque maze, among other unflattering things.”238 
Seeking a modest measure of order in the midst of all this 
chaos, this Article has proposed a solution to the “ripeness puzzle” 
underlying the compensation prong.  For decades, judges and 
scholars have questioned whether this rule should be 
                                                                                                       
one of them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might 
be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the people.”). 
 235 Cf. J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of Williamson County’s 
Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41 URB. 
LAW. 615, 626 (2009) (“ ‘[T]he barring of the federal courthouse door to takings litigants 
seems an unanticipated effect of Williamson County . . . .’ ” (quoting DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 
381 F.3d 511, 521 (6th Cir. 2004))); Fein, supra note 113, at 784 (“I do not mean to suggest 
that Justices intended something other than what they wrote in Williamson County; more 
likely they simply failed to foresee the complex doctrinal and jurisdictional implications 
that the new rule would create.”). 
 236 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (making point that so-called “business 
regulations” are not immune from constitutional scrutiny in any of those areas). 
 237 Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 n.2 (1993) (collecting “characteristic 
characterizations of takings doctrine”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 238  Fein, supra note 113, at 773 (collecting descriptions) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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characterized as stemming from the Constitution itself—either 
from Article III or the Fifth Amendment—or simply from the 
judiciary’s notions of prudent policy.  While the Supreme Court 
has recently commented on the matter, its statements endorsing a 
prudential framing of the requirement have provided only a 
partial and largely unexplained solution.  This Article has 
attempted to expand on and justify those remarks in order to 
elucidate an analytically sturdier understanding of the 
compensation prong. 
Specifically, I have examined the Williamson County ripeness 
puzzle through the lens of several vexing questions, arguing that 
they are best accessed through and answered by a prudential 
solution.  Viewing the compensation prong as prudential in nature 
demonstrates why so-called “facial” federal takings challenges 
have been seen as appropriately laying claim to a federal forum in 
the first instance and allows for the continuation of this tradition 
in the manner most respectful of the state-regarding concerns 
expressed in San Remo Hotel.  A prudential view also allows 
courts to consider the propriety of exercising supplemental—and, 
to a lesser extent, diversity—jurisdiction over the predicate state 
claims required by the compensation prong on a case-by-case basis 
with pertinent federalism principles in mind.   
Moreover, a constitutional reading of the compensation prong 
could bind state-court claimants just as if they were in federal 
court.  They would therefore be required to attempt to engage in 
two rounds of litigation in order to pursue a Fifth Amendment 
regulatory-takings challenge—an initial state compensation claim 
followed by the federal claim, both in state court.  And, also just as 
in the federal-court system, claim-preclusion principles could kick 
in to bar the latter round of state litigation from actually 
occurring, thereby rendering some Fifth Amendment claims 
effectively forum-less.  A prudential solution to the ripeness puzzle 
could eliminate the unintended potential consequences of wasting 
resources and closing essentially all courthouse doors in the face of 
some would-be Fifth Amendment litigants. 
Much more work remains to be done in this murky area.  
Perhaps for now, though, we have moved one step closer to better 
understanding—and even beginning to solve—the Williamson 
County ripeness puzzle.  
 
